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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This Court granted the State's interlocutory appeal following the district court's
determination that under the law of the case doctrine, it was required to follow the Court
of Appeals holding that Mr. Hawkins is entitled to a new trial. In response to the State's
Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hawkins asserts that (1) the district court was without authority to
perform any act except to order a new trial based upon the mandatory

languC~ge

of

Idaho Appellate Rule 38 that requires once a remittitur has been issued by the Idaho
Supreme Court, the opinion has become final and "the district court or administrative
agency shall forthwith comply with the directive of the opinion; (2) the State is precluded
from raising its retroactive competency claim by not addressing the issue when it was
presented in the prior appeal; (3) because the remedy for a violation of the law is a
necessary component to every criminal judicial decision, the Court of Appeals
determination that Mr. Hawkins was entitled to a new trial in light of the district court's
failure to sua sponte order a competency evaluation is law of the case; and (4) the
district court erred in determining that Mr. Hawkins was retrospectively competent.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In its Opinion reversing Mr. Hawkins' convictions for two counts of robbery and
remanding his case for a new trial, the Court of Appeals reiterated the facts leading up
to and following Mr. Hawkins' trial as follows:
On December 15, 2005, Hawkins contacted retired Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) agent George Calley and expressed concerns about
the safety of his sons who were incarcerated in Colorado for bank robbery.
Calley was familiar with Hawkins and told Hawkins that he could not
protect the boys but that he could put Hawkins in contact with a current
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agent of the FBI in Boise. Hawkins told Calley that he wanted to work with
the FBI and that he had been working with an assistant United States
Attorney in Portland, Oregon. The next day, December 16, 2005, Hawkins
robbed a Key Bank in Boise by presenting a note that demanded $15,000
and threatened to shoot people if his demands were not met or if anyone
tried to follow him. Photos of the robber were made by a security camera
in the bank. Following the robbery, a teller at the bank identified Hawkins
in a photographic line-up, but police were unable to locate Hawkins.
After hearing and seeing news reports on the bank robbery, Calley
informed law enforcement of his conversation with Hawkins and that he
suspected Hawkins was the perpetrator. A few days later, Hawkins left a
message on Calley's answering machine. Essentially, Hawkins said that
since he had not heard from Calley, he assumed that Calley could not
help him. Calley tried to call and email Hawkins back but his attempts to
reach Hawkins were unsuccessful.
Several months later, on June 6, 2006, Hawkins robbed a
Washington Mutual Bank in Boise in the same manner as he had
done in the Key Bank robbery, by presenting a note demanding $15,000
and threatening to shoot people. Again, a surveillance camera
photographed the robber. As he was leaving with the money, Hawkins
turned to the tellers and said, "By the way, my name is Faron Hawkins,
and this is all because of George Calley." Hawkins called Calley a
few days later and told him that he had used Calley's name in the bank
robbery. Calley offered to help Hawkins find an attorney, but Hawkins did
not respond to Calley's offer and terminated the conversation.
On August 10, 2006, law enforcement located Hawkins at a
campground near The Dalles, Oregon, where he was staying with his
wife and children in a camp trailer.
When an officer attempted to
make contact with Hawkins at the camp trailer, Hawkins pointed a loaded
gun at the officer. The officer retreated and, after the campground was
evacuated, law enforcement officers surrounded the trailer and ordered
Hawkins to come out. An eight-hour standoff ensued during which
Hawkins fired a gun in the direction of the officers, but eventually allowed
his wife and children to leave the trailer. Hawkins was finally taken into
custody after the officers shot tear gas into the trailer, forcing Hawkins to
come out.
When interviewed by Oregon police, Hawkins stated that he
had been a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative, had knowledge
of transportation of weapons to Canada, had been involved in a
South American operation with a National Security Agency (NSA)
advisor and, at some point, had cut a transponder out of his earlobe that
had been placed there by "someone." Hawkins also claimed to be a
sophisticated criminal and freely admitted that he had committed the
December 16, 2005, Boise bank robbery. A warrant to search Hawkins'
van, pickup, and camp trailer was obtained and executed. During the

2

search, several items of clothing that matched the description of items
used during the Boise bank robberies, together with a checkbook
containing one of the robber's demand notes, were seized. When
Hawkins was interviewed by an FBI agent he stated that his wife and
stepson liked to spend money, and that his wife encouraged his stepson
to rob banks to get more money. He also stated that he and his wife
helped his stepson rob banks by monitoring police scanners, and that he
had suggested to his stepson that he should rob banks by using a demand
note. However, in subsequent interviews with the FBI agent, Hawkins
stated that he and his stepson were forced to commit the robberies.
Hawkins claimed that the men who forced him to rob the banks threatened
his wife and children. He also claimed that the men put a bomb vest on
him and threatened to detonate it if he did not rob the Key Bank, and
again put a bomb vest on him and forced him to wear an earpiece when
he robbed the Washington Mutual Bank.
A grand jury indicted Hawkins on two counts of robbery. Hawkins
moved to proceed pro se, and after an extensive Faretta inquiry, the
district court granted Hawkins' request for self-representation but also
appointed a public defender as standby counsel. Later, Hawkins again
requested that counsel be reappointed and the court granted his
request. After that appointment, Hawkins changed his mind and again
moved to proceed pro se. The court conducted another Farreta inquiry,
granted the motion, and appointed the public defender as standby
counsel. On January 7, 2008, trial commenced and Hawkins testified on
his own behalf. He admitted to the bank robberies, but claimed that
they were done under duress. Hawkins stated that the people who
forced him to commit the robberies did so by making threats to him, to his
wife, and to his children. Ultimately, the jury found Hawkins guilty of the
robberies.
Hawkins filed a motion for new trial and then moved for
reappointment of counsel, and the court granted this request. A few
minutes later, Hawkins' counsel advised the court that Hawkins was
dissatisfied with counsel's performance because counsel did not believe
there was any basis to move for a mistrial or for a new trial.
Hawkins requested that he be allowed to continue to pro se argue his
motions. The district court noted that Hawkins had filed a motion to
"dismiss on the grounds of mental incapacity" claiming that the state's
evidence showed that he was delusional. The district court denied the
motion to dismiss but, based on Hawkins' claim of mental incapacity,
ordered a psychological evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code § 192522 for purposes of sentencing. The court also declined Hawkins'
motion to proceed pro se, noting that "if Mr. Hawkins is contending that he
is delusional, I don't think his decision whether to hire or not keep an
attorney, at this point, is appropriate."
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At a subsequent hearing, the district court set forth for the record
that it had never had cause to believe that Hawkins lacked the mental
capacity to understand the proceedings or to assist in his own
defense. The court noted that it had ordered the psychological evaluation
for sentencing purposes "in an abundance of caution" based on the
assertions made by Hawkins in his motion to dismiss that had been filed
shortly after the jury had reached its verdicts. The court further noted
that Hawkins had failed to participate in the psychological evaluation
and, after questioning Hawkins, the court determined that Hawkins
was asserting his Fifth Amendment rights not to participate in such an
evaluation. At Hawkins' request, the court ordered the public defender to
continue to represent Hawkins and set the case over for hearing on the
multiple post-trial motions that Hawkins had filed pro se.
At the
subsequent motion hearing, Hawkins' counsel advised Hawkins and the
court that, if asked to argue Hawkins' post-trial motions, his position would
be that the motions had no merit. Based on counsel's representation, the
court permitted Hawkins to argue his motions pro se, finding once again
that Hawkins was competent to waive counsel and that he did so freely
and voluntarily. Following argument, the district court denied Hawkins'
motions.
The case proceeded to a sentencing hearing, at which
Hawkins was represented by the public defender. The district court
imposed concurrent unified sentences of life with thirty years fixed.
Hawkins timely appealed.
State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 775-777 (Ct. App. 2009) (footnotes omitted).

On appeal, Mr. Hawkins argued that the district court erred in failing to order a
psychiatric examination to determine Mr. Hawkins' competency to stand trial. (35281
Appellant's Brief, pp.18-22.) 1 As a remedy, Mr. Hawkins argued that he was entitled to
a new trial because retroactive competency hearings are disfavored. 2

(35281

Appellant's Brief, p.22 (citing Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975).)

1

In

Contemporaneously with this brief, Mr. Hawkins has filed a motion asking this Court to
take judicial notice of the briefing from Mr. Hawkins' prior direct appeal, as well as the
State's Petition for Review and Remittitur in S.C. Docket No. 35281. For ease of
referencing, citation to the briefing and documents from S.C. Docket No. 35281 will
reference to the title on the document filed, as well of the docket number of the previous
appeal.
2
Mr. Hawkins also argued, in the alternative, that his case should be remanded for a
determination as to whether he was competent to waive his Constitutional right to
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response, the State argued that "the record is devoid of any evidence that would have
raised a bona fide doubt about [Mr. Hawkins] mental capacity either to understand the
proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense, such that the district court
would have been required to order a competency evaluation on its own motion." (35281
Respondent's Brief, p.13.) The State, however, never addressed Mr. Hawkins' claim
that if there was error, the proper remedy was to vacate the conviction and remand for a
new trial. (See 35281 Respondent's Brief, pp.1-27.) In his Reply Brief, Mr. Hawkins
again asked that the district court vacate his convictions, leaving the State free to retry
him if he is deemed competent. (35281 Appellant's Reply Brief, p.4 (citing Drape, 420
U.S. at 183).)
The Idaho Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Hawkins. See Hawkins, 148 Idaho
at 777-783. First, the Hawkins Court held:
Hawkins' behavior and his stories consistently raised questions as
to whether he had a rational understanding of the proceedings against him
even though he appeared capable of preparing and arguing his own
defense. All of these behaviors, statements, and events should have
raised a bona fide doubt about Hawkins' competency to stand trial and to
conduct his own defense. Taking into account all of the indicia of bizarre
notions demonstrated before trial started, there was enough evidence in
this case to put the district court on notice that Hawkins' competence was
in question. Even if the pretrial conduct was insufficient to call for a
competency evaluation, certainly Hawkins' testimony during the trial
presented compelling indicia that he was not in touch with reality. When
taking the entire record into account, the district court should have
entertained a reasonable doubt about Hawkins' mental competency either
to stand trial or to represent himself. Therefore, the district court's failure
to sua sponte order a mental evaluation and make a determination as to
Hawkins' competency was an abuse of discretion.

/d. at 782-783.

Next, the Court of Appeals stated that the proper remedy was,

"[b]ecause it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins'

counsel. Because the Court of Appeals did not have to address this issue in the appeal,
it will not be discussed any further. (See 35281 Appellant's Brief, pp.22-26.)
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competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction and
leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand trial." /d. at
783.
The State filed a Petition for Review and Brief in Support of Petition for Review
with the Idaho Supreme Court. (See generally 35281 Petition For Review and Brief in
Support of Petition for Review.) 3 In its Brief in Support of Petition for Review, the State
challenged the standard employed by the Court of Appeals in finding that the district
court should have sua sponte ordered a competency evaluation, and that there was
insufficient evidence to raise a doubt about Mr. Hawkins' competency. (35281 Brief in
Support of Petition For Review, pp.15-27.)

The State, however, again neglected to

address or argue against the Court of Appeals' determination that Mr. Hawkins is
entitled to a new trial. (See 35281 Brief in Support of Petition For Review, pp.1-27.)
This Court denied the State's Petition for Review and issued the Remittitur commanding
the district court comply with the Court of Appeals' Opinion by vacating Mr. Hawkins'
convictions, ordering that a competency evaluation be conducted, and conducting a
new trial in the event the district court determines that Mr. Hawkins is competent to
stand trial. (35281 Remittitur.)
On remand, the district court ordered competency evaluations to be conducted
by Dr. Estess and Dr. Sombke. (R., pp.29-30, 34-35, 39-40.) In the first competency
evaluation conducted by Dr. Sombke, he opined that while "Mr. Hawkins did show an
adequate level of factual understanding of the court process, his ability to effectively and

3

Contemporaneously with this brief, Mr. Hawkins has filed a motion asking this Court to
take judicial notice of the briefing from Mr. Hawkins' prior direct appeal, as well as the
State's Petition for Review and the Remittitur in S.C. Docket No. 35281. For ease of
reference, citation to the briefing and documents from S.C. Docket No. 35281 will
6

appropriately interact with his attorney is extremely impaired."

(R., p.164.) 4

Dr. Sombke continued, "[h]is delusional belief system is totally controlling his decisions
regarding his court case and he is currently unable to logically and rationally participate
in a court hearing.

Furthermore, he does not appear capable of interacting with his

attorney in a logical and rational manner at this time and he is in need of psychiatric
treatment."

(R., p.164.)

Of particular note, Dr. Sombke reported that Mr. Hawkins

completed the SIRS-2 test which "was designed to evaluate malingering and other
forms of dissimulation." (R., p.163.) According to Dr. Sombke, "Mr. Hawkins' scores
indicated that he was responding in a genuine manner and did not show any signs of
malingering or feigning a mental illness." (R., p.163.)
On October 15, 2010, Dr. Estess filed a two page "report" indicating that "there is
no reason why Mr. Hawkins should not be able to confer with his attorney in his own
defense and satisfy all of the other requirements that would allow him to be adjudicated
to be competent to stand trial."

(R., pp.166-167.)

At the hearing on Mr. Hawkins'

competency determination, based upon his discussions with Dr. Estess and the review
of other material he was not provided at the time of his initial report, Dr. Sombke
changed his mind. (11/12/10 Tr., p.20, L.22- p.29, L.2.) Dr. Sombke testified that he
now believes that Mr. Hawkins is competent to stand trial. (11/12/10 Tr., p.29, Ls.3-20.)
Additionally, Dr. Estess expressed his belief that Mr. Hawkins was competent to stand
trial back in January of 2008, at the time he was initially tried in this case. (11/12/10 Tr.,
p.1 00, Ls.8-13.)

reference to the title on the document filed, as well as the docket number of the
previous appeal.
4
Dr. Sombke's evaluation was signed on August 11, 2010. (R., p.165.)
7

Following the hearing, the district court determined that Mr. Hawkins was
competent to stand trial. (R., pp.134-136.) Additionally, the district court found that it
believed that Mr. Hawkins was competent in January of 2008, but "is constrained by the
law of the case and is bound to follow the remittitur of the Idaho Court of Appeals." (R.,
pp.134-136.) Appointed defense counsel for Mr. Hawkins was then allowed to withdraw
from the case after alleging that he had a conflict of interest with Mr. Hawkins. (See R.,
pp.120-124, 137-139, 236-237; 12/5/10 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-10.) Mr. Hawkins then chose to
proceed pro se, with the district court appointing the Ada County Public Defender's
Office as standby counsel. (12/15/10 Tr., p.6, L.8- p.8, L.16.)
The following day, the State filed a Motion for Permission to Appeal, wherein the
State asked the district court for permission to file an interlocutory appeal and determine
that Mr. Hawkins was retroactively competent. (R., pp.243-252.) At the hearing on the
State's Motion for Permission to Appeal, while acting pro se, Mr. Hawkins stated he had
no objection to the State's request for an interlocutory appeal because "I would like to
see another court take a look at exactly what is going on in this Court." (1/26/11 Tr.,
p.11, L.24- p.12, L.5.) On February 1, 2011, the district court entered a Memorandum
Decision on State's Motion for Permission to Appeal and Order Granting State's Motion
for Permission to Appeal. (R., pp.272-277.) Following this Court's grant of the State's
request for an interlocutory appeal, the State filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.367-373.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court correctly determine that Mr. Hawkins is entitled to a new trial
based upon the Court of Appeals' holding in his case?

2.

Did the district court err in making the retrospective determination that
Mr. Hawkins was competent in January of 2008?

9

ARGUMENT

I.
Mr. Hawkins Is Entitled To A New Trial In The Event The State Chooses To Retry Him
On The Robbery Charges
A.

Introduction
This Court granted the State's interlocutory appeal following the district court's

determination that under the law of the case doctrine, it was required to follow the Court
of Appeals' holding that Mr. Hawkins is entitled to a new trial. In response to the State's
Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hawkins asserts that (1) the State waived Its current claim that Mr.
Hawkins was competent in January of 2008 because the Attorney General's Office not
only failed to respond to Mr. Hawkins' claim in the first appeal that a new trial was the
appropriate remedy for the district's error, but also neglected to challenge the Court of
Appeals' holding that "[b]ecause

it

is

not

possible

to

retroactively make a

determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the
judgment of conviction and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be
competent to stand trial" in its Brief in Support of Petition for Review; (2) because the
remedy for a violation of the law is a necessary component to every criminal judicial
decision, the Court of Appeals' determination that Mr. Hawkins was entitled to a new
trial in light of the district court's failure to sua sponte order a competency evaluation is
law of the case; and (3) the district court was without authority to perform any act except
to order a new trial based upon the mandatory language of Idaho Appellate Rule 38 that
requires once a remittitur has been issued by the Idaho Supreme Court, the opinion has
become final and "the district court or administrative agency shall forthwith comply with
the directive of the opinion."
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B.

Mr. Hawkins Is Entitled To A New Trial In The Event The State Chooses To Retry
Him On The Robbery Charges
In Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court

observed:
"[t]he doctrine of the law of the case provides that where an appellate
court states a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule becomes the
law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same." The
decision on an issue of law made at one stage of a proceeding becomes
precedent to be followed in successive stages of that same litigation.
"[LJike stare decisis it protects against relitigation of settled issues and
assures obedience of inferior courts to decisions of superior courts."
/d. at 516 (citing Frazier v. Neilson & Co., 118 Idaho 104, 106 (Ct. App. 1990). More
recently, as the State partially recognized in its Appellant's Brief, the Idaho Supreme
Court has further articulated the "law of the case" doctrine as follows:
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme Court, in
deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law
necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of
the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress,
both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal." The "law of the case"
doctrine also prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged
errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal. 5
Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
1.

Pursuant To I.A.R. 38, The District Court Only Had The Authority To Order
A New Trial

Idaho Appellate Rule 38 provides, in pertinent part, that:
When the opinion filed has become ·final in accordance with this rule, the
Clerk of the Supreme Court shall issue and file a remittitur with the district
court or administrative agency appealed from and mail copies to all parties
5

As addressed in more detail below, the italicized portion of the above quotation was
not contained in either the State's Appellant's Brief to this Court, or the State's Motion
For Acceptance Of Appeal By Permission And Statement In Support Thereof to this
Court. Despite its omission by the State, the above quotation represents the complete
standard for review of "law of the case" as identified by this Court in Taylor. Compare
Appellant's Brief, p. 7 with Taylor, 146 Idaho at 709.
11

to the appeal and the presiding district court judge or chairman of the
agency. The remittitur shall advise the district court or administrative
agency that the opinion has become final and that the district court or
administrative agency shall forthwith comply with the directive of the
opinion.
I.A.R. 38(c) (emphasis added).
The language of this rule is mandatory - once an opinion becomes final, the
district court is required to comply with the specific directives provided by the opinion
rendered by either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. As such, the district
court correctly determined that it was required to grant Mr. Hawkins a new trial.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court's order finding that it was bound
by State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774 (Ct. App. 2009) and remand this case for the new
trial that should have occurred 22 months ago.
2.

The State Waived Any Challenge To Whether Mr. Hawkins Was
Competent In January Of 2010

The State is precluded from now arguing that this Court should consider whether
Mr. Hawkins was retroactively competent in January of 2008 because the "law of the
case" doctrine prevents a party from relitigating an issue on a subsequent appeal, when
it had an earlier opportunity to address the same issue, but did not.
In the instant appeal, the State argues that the Court of Appeals determination
that a new trial was the proper remedy was not law of the case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.811.) In making its argument, the State points this Court to its own definition for law of
the case as "consistently articulated" by this Court as follows:
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme
Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule
of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the
law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal."
12

(Appellant's Brief, p.7 (quoting Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709 (2009) (citations
omitted).) Curiously missing from the State's recitation of the "law of the case" doctrine,
as articulated in Taylor, is the very next sentence, which states, "[t]he "law of the case"
doctrine also prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that
might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal." Taylor, 146 at 709.
On appeal, the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that a
retroactive competency determination was not possible in this case and that a new trial
is the appropriate remedy.

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-11.)

However, in making its

argument, the State failed to disclose to this Court the complete standard for
determining "law of the case" under Taylor in its State's Motion For Acceptance Of
Appeal By Permission And Statement In Support Thereof to this Court. The State also
neglected to acknowledge that the remedy granted by the Idaho Court of Appeals was
first briefed by Mr. Hawkins in his Appellant's Brief in the first appeal, where in appellate
counsel stated:
In general, retrospective
The question then becomes remedy.
competency hearings are disfavored. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
183, 95 S.Ct. 896, 909 (1975). In Drope, the Supreme Court ordered that
the judgment be reversed leaving the state free to retry Drope. In this
case, the same remedy is appropriate. At this point, as in Drope, it is not
possible to make an evaluation of Mr. Hawkins' competency at the time he
was tried.
The only remedy that will fulfill the state and federal
constitutional due process guarantees is to reverse the judgment of
conviction leaving the state free to retry Mr. Hawkins if he is now
competent to stand trial.
(35281 Appellant's Brief, p.22} At that time, the State had the opportunity to respond
to Mr. Hawkins' argument that a new trial was the appropriate remedy. However, the
State's Respondent's Brief contains no reference to retroactive competency, or what the

6

The attorney representing the Attorney General's Office in the instant appeal is the
same attorney that represented the State in Supreme Court Docket No. 35281.
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appropriate remedy would be if an error did occur. (See 35281 Respondent's Brief,
pp.1-27.) Instead, the State limited itself to arguing that there was not any evidence
before the district court, "such that the district court would have been required to order a
competency evaluation on its own motion." (35281 Respondent's Brief, p.13.) Then, in
his Reply Brief, Mr. Hawkins again asked the district court vacate his convictions,
leaving the State free to retry him if he is deemed competent. (35281 Appellant's Reply
Brief, p.4 (citing Drape, 420 U.S. at 183).) The State's Appellant's Brief in the instant
appeal also does not mention this.
Following the submission of all briefing to the Idaho Court of Appeals, the Court
agreed with Mr. Hawkins, finding that given the evidence before the district court, it
erred in failing to sua sponte order a competency evaluation of Mr. Hawkins. Hawkins,
148 U.S. at 777-783. The Court of Appeals then concluded that the proper remedy was,
"[b]ecause it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins'
competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction and
leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand triaL" /d. at
783. It is this last statement that the State alleged to be the error committed by the
Court of Appeals.
Despite the fact the State apparently disagrees with this determination, the State
fails to divulge to this Court in any of the documents filed in the instant appeal, that it
filed a Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Hawkins.
Additionally, in the Brief in Support of that Petition for Review, the State again, did not
challenge the Court of Appeals finding that a retroactive competency finding is not
possible and Mr. Hawkins is entitled to a new trial.
Petition For Review, pp.1-27.)
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(See 35281 Brief in Support of

Pursuant to this Court's clear holding in Taylor, because the State failed to
challenge the alleged errors which occurred during a prior appeal, it is foreclosed from
raising those claims in the instant appeal. The State was given two opportunities, first in
the Court of Appeals, and then in this Court, to argue whether a new trial was the proper
remedy for the error that occurred in Mr. Hawkins' trial. The State affirmatively failed to
do so both times and is foreclosed from now doing so. Not only is the State seeking to
circumvent the law, while Mr. Hawkins sits in jail, but the State has affirmatively failed to
disclose to this Court the complete statement of the law and its own actions which,
based on the part of the law it omitted, foreclose its current actions.
Accordingly, because the State did not challenge the remedy given by the Court
of Appeals in State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774 (Ct. App. 2009), it is prevented from now
doing so under the "law of the case."
3.

The Court Of Appeals' Determination That Mr. Hawkins' Is Entitled To A
New Trial In Light Of The District Court's Failure To Sua Sponte Order A
Competency Evaluation Is Law Of The Case

Regarding whether the Court of Appeals' chosen remedy for the district court's
error was Jaw of the case, the State argues first that,
the statement at issue was not necessary to the Court of Appeals'
resolution of the only issue(s) it identified on appeal- i.e., "whether in the
course of Hawkins' self-representation, the district court should have
considered sua sponte whether Hawkins was competent to undergo trial,
and if so, whether Hawkins was rational enough to represent himself
rather than be represented by counsel." Whether Hawkins could or
could not be retroactively deemed competent following a competency
evaluation on remand had no bearing on the question actually before
the Court of Appeals whether the trial court should have entertained a
bona fide doubt about Hawkins' competency such that it should have
sua sponte ordered an evaluation at the time of trial. Because the
question of whether it is possible to make a retroactive determination of
Hawkins' competency to stand trial in 2008 was neither necessary nor
relevant to the Court of Appeals' determination that the trial court should
have ordered a competency evaluation during the 2008 proceedings,
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it does not appear under established principles of law, that the Court of
Appeals' statement that a retroactive
determination of Hawkins'
competency "is not possible" is actually "law of the case."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9 (internal citations omitted).)
In essence, the State is arguing that the remedy, (in this case a new trial) for any
district court error or constitutional violation, "has no bearing" on the actual decision
rendered by the Court. Contrary to the State's position, the remedy for an error by the
district court or the violation of a constitutional right is a necessary component to every
criminal judicial decision, especially in the instant case where the Court of Appeals
vacated the convictions, rather than merely remanding the case for a competency
evaluation leaving the convictions intact. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961 ); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (201 0).

Further, law of the case is "like stare

decisis it protects against relitigation of settled issues and assures obedience of inferior
courts to decision of superior courts," which is exactly what the State is asking this
Court to do, relitigate an issue that has already been decided by the Court of Appeals.
See Swanson, 134 Idaho at 516 (citing Frazier v. Neilson & Co., 118 Idaho 104, 106

(Ct. App. 1990). The State has already had the opportunity to challenge this issue and
neglected to do so. The district court properly recognized that as an inferior court, it
was required to follow the decision of the superior appellate court.
Next, relying on Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490 (2001) (hereinafter, Stuart II), the
State argues:
although the Court of Appeals expressed its view, apparently based upon
the record before it, that it is not possible to retroactively determine
Hawkins competency when he was tried in 2008, there is no indication
that the words chosen were actually intended by the Court to limit the trial
court's power on remand to make its own finds regarding whether such a
determination is possible.
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.)
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The State's argument ignores the plain language of the opinion, the effect of the
remedy, and the jurisdiction of the district court.

Further, the instant case is

substantially different than Stuart. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals stated,
""[b]ecause it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins'
competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction and
leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand trial." /d. at
783.

In its conclusion, the Court stated, "we vacate the judgment of conviction and

remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion."

/d.

The

"intent" of the opinion could not be more clear, a retroactive competency determination
"is not possible," so the Court of Appeals vacated the conviction. Certainly the State's
argument - other than the fact the State affirmatively waived it - might have had legs if
the Court of Appeals had not vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial, if
Mr. Hawkins was found to be presently competent. If the Court of Appeals had intended
to do what the State surmises, it would have simply remanded the case for a
competence evaluation, leaving the convictions intact.
Even if we ignore the plain language that a retroactive competence determination
"is not possible" in this case, and we assume that the intent of the Court of Appeals was
to remand for a retroactive competency hearing, the district court would still have no
-

jurisdiction to re-impose the conviction without a guilty plea or finding of guilt by a jury.
See U.S. CaNsT. amend. V. ("[nJo person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law .... "); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.; ID. IDAHO CaNST. ART. I,§ 13.;
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Moreover, on remand, the trial court can only "take

actions it is specifically directed to take, or those which are subsidiary to the actions

17

directed by the appellate court State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886 (2000) (citing
Walters v. lndustriallndem. Co., 130 Idaho 836,838 (1997)).

Additionally, the State's reliance on Stuart is unavailing. In Stuart v. State, 118
Idaho 932 (1990) (hereinafter, Stuart /), the Idaho Supreme Court had to consider
whether Stuart raised sufficient facts in his Petition for Post Conviction Relief
(hereinafter, Petition) that the Sheriff's Department had been recording his attorney-

client conversations to withstand a motion for summary disposition.

!d. at 935. The

Stuart I Court remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing with

instructions for the trial court to determine:
(1) whether there was recording of attorney-client conversations on the
part of the Sheriff's Department; and, (2) whether the appellant's
constitutional rights were violated. If such attorney-client conversations are
found to have been recorded, the State will be required to show that the
evidence at trial had an origin independent of the eavesdropping. Any
knowledge wrongfully gained by the government cannot be used against a
defendant
!d. (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)).

Eleven years later, Stuart's case was back before the Idaho Supreme Court after
the district court determined that Stuart's constitutional rights had not been violated?
Stuart II, 136 Idaho at 494.

The trial court "applied the three exceptions to the

exclusionary rule, holding that under the independent origin, inevitable discovery, and
attenuated basis exceptions, the monitoring of telephone conversations did not lead to
the discovery of witnesses." !d. On appeal, Stuart argued that based on the "law of the
case," the trial court was limited to applying the origin independent exception. /d. at
495. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and held that it was not error for the trial

7

A correct statement of the law would be that the district court found that although
Stuart's constitutional rights were violated, suppression is not appropriate remedy
because the court applied the three exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
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court to consider all three exceptions because "it cannot be presumed that this Court
has decided that the inevitable discovery and attenuated basis exceptions should not be
applied in Idaho." /d.
In the instant case, unlike Stuart II, the language of the Court of Appeals
amounted to an express limitation against a court being allowed to determine
Mr. Hawkins' competence retrospectively, whereas in Stuart II, the prior opinion did not
limit the trial court from considering other exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Hawkins,
148 U.S. at 777-783. In addition, the discretion and authority of the trial court in this
case is further limited by the fact the Court of Appeals vacated Mr. Hawkins'
convictions. So even if it was permissible for the district court to attempt to determine
Mr. Hawkins' competency in January of 2008, it would still be required to give him a new
trial.
Effectively, the State is attempting to relitigate an issue because it neglected to
do so when the issue was properly in front of the appellate court and are not satisfied
with the outcome articulated by the Idaho Court of Appeals. 8 Accordingly, as in set forth
herein, because the remedy articulated by the Court of Appeals is necessary to its
decision, the Court of Appeals' holding that Mr. Hawkins is entitled to a new trial upon
being found competent.

8

Taken to its logical conclusion, if granted relief, this Court would be encouraging every
criminal defendant to relitigate every issue in their case, regardless of how many times
that issue has been addressed by the appellate court, which would cause needless
expense.
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II.
The District Court Erred In Determining That Mr. Hawkins Was Retrospectively
Competent Throughout His Trial In January Of 2008

A.

Introduction
On appeal, following Mr. Hawkins' conviction on two counts of robbery, the Idaho

Court of Appeals held that "[bJecause it is not possible to retroactively make a
determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the
judgment of conviction and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be
competent to stand trial." Hawkins, 148 Idaho at 783. The State filed a Petition for
Review and supporting brief, which was denied by the Idaho Supreme Court. Of note,
in its Brief in Support of Petition for Review, the State neglected to challenge the Court
of Appeals' holding that it was "not possible" to make a retrospective determination as to
Mr. Hawkins' competency throughout his trial in January of 2008. Following remand,
after Mr. Hawkins was found presently competent, the district court ruled that it would
find Mr. Hawkins to be retrospectively competent in January of 2008, but it was bound
by "law of the case" to proceed to a new trial. Mr. Hawkins asserts that the district court
erred in determining that Mr. Hawkins was retrospectively competent.

B.

The District Court Erred In Determining That Mr. Hawkins Was Retrospectively
Competent Throughout His Trial In January Of 2008
The failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to

be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process
right to a fair trial. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).

In Drape, supra, the

Supreme Court held that a state's statutory procedure for determining an accused's
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mental capacity to stand trial is constitutionally adequate to protect a defendant's due
process right not to be tried while legally incompetent. /d. 420 U.S. at 173.
The applicable legal standard governing a district court's decision to conduct a
competency evaluation is governed by I.C. §§ 18-210 and 18-211. Idaho Code§ 18211, which requires that when there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to
proceed as set forth in section 18-210, Idaho Code, the court shall appoint at least one
qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist, who upon completion of an examination
of the defendant shall submit a report to the court. The report should include an opinion
as to the defendant's capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist
in his own defense. I. C. § 18-21 0(5)(c). The issue of a defendant's fitness to proceed is
determined by the trial court.
The test for determining capacity to stand trial is whether a defendant has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and whether he has a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the
proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); State v.
Lovelace, 1431daho 53 (2003); State v. Longoria, 1331daho 819,822, (Ct. App. 1999).
1.

The District Court Was Without Authority To Order A Retrospective
Competency Evaluation

As is set forth above in section 1(8 ), which is incorporated by reference herein,
because the Idaho Court of Appeals determined it was "not possible to retroactively
make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried" and the
State failed to challenge that finding by the Idaho Court of Appeal, it became law of the
case. Once the remittitur was issued, the opinion becomes 'final and the district court is
required to comply with the specific directives provided by the opinion rendered by the
21

Court of Appeals. I.A.R. 38(c). The district court was ordered to conduct a competency
evaluation of Mr. Hawkins to determine whether he is presently competent and if so,
then the State would be permitted to retry Mr. Hawkins. Accordingly, this Court need
not address the State's argument on appeal that Idaho should permit retrospective
competency determination and that a retrospective competency determination is
permissible in the instant case.
2.

Assuming, Arguendo, This Court Should Hold That Retrospective
Competency Determinations More Than A Year Following The Relevant
Proceeding Do Not Comport With Due Process

The United States Supreme Court has never held that a retrospective
competence determination, over a year after the trial, comports with due process. The
first United States Supreme Court case to address the issue was Dusky, supra.

In

Dusky, the United States Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for a
new competency hearing because of the "difficulties of retrospectively determining the
petitioner's competency as of more than a year ago[.]" /d. 362 U.S. at 403. Next, in
Pate, the United States Supreme Court refused to correct the violation of Pate's
constitutional right to receive an adequate competency determination by remanding the
case for a retrospective competency determination. /d. 383 U.S. at 386-387. The Pate
Court reiterated "the difficulty of retrospectively determining an accused's competence
to stand trial." /d. at 387 (citing Dusky, 362 U.S. at 403). The Court observed, [t]he jury
would not be able to observe the subject of their inquiry, and expert witnesses would
have to testify solely from information contained in the printed record. That Robinson's
hearing would be held six years after the fact aggravates these difficulties." /d. 383 U.S.
at 387 (1966). Most recently, in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), the United
States Supreme Court stated, "Given the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc
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determination under the most favorable circumstances, we cannot conclude that such a
procedure would be adequate here." /d. 420 U.S. at 183 (internal citations omitted).
Further complicating matters is that "[m]ental competency is not a static condition
and is to be determined "at the time of trial'." Edwards v. State, 902 N.E. 2d 821 (Ind.
2009). No case better represents this problem than the instant case where the State
seeks retrial, in part because, Mr. Hawkins' retrospective competency determination
was made 34 months after the conclusion of his trial. The State is now attempting to
avoid a retrial because there is a "very high likelihood" that the very same issues that
occurred during the first trial- where Mr. Hawkins will raise mental illness issues- and,
"pursuant to the Court of Appeals' decision, this Court will be required to stop the trial
and/or declare a mistrial and attempt to obtain yet another psychological evaluation."
(R., pp.247-248.)
Accordingly, in light of the problems inherent in retroactive competency
determinations, Mr. Hawkins asks this Court to hold that the remedy for a competency
violation be a new trial because of the "difficulties of retrospectively determining the
petitioner's competency as of more than a year ago[.]" /d. 362 U.S. at 403. Further, all
other determination as to whether a defendant is retrospectively competent shall be
made on a case by case basis.
3.

Assuming Arguendo, Given The Passage Of Time Since His Trial, The
Static Nature Of Mental Illness, And Mr. Hawkins' Actions During First
Trial, A Retroactive Determination Of Mr. Hawkins' Competency
Throughout His Trial Is Not Possible

The

United

States

Supreme

Court

has

observed

that

retrospective

determinations of a defendant's competency are disfavored because of "the inherent
difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable
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circumstances."

Drape, 420 U.S. at 183.

However, some courts have held that a

retrospective competency determination is "permissible when a court can conduct a
meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the competency of the defendant."
McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 962 (1Oth Cir. 2001 ).

Those courts permitting

retroactive competence evaluation look to four factors:
(1) [T]he passage of time, (2) the availability of contemporaneous medical
evidence, including medical records and prior competency determinations,
(3) any statements by the defendant in the trial record, and (4) the
availability of individuals and trial witnesses, both experts and nonexperts, who were in a position to interact with defendant before and
during trial, including the trial judge, counsel for both the government and
defendant, and jail officials.
/d. 248 F.3d at 962-63 (citations omitted).

Mr. Hawkins asserts that, based on the circumstance and facts presented in his
case, a meaningful and accurate retrospective competence evaluation is not possible.
Mr. Hawkins was convicted in January of 2008 and it was not until December of 2010,
34 months later, that the district court rendered a decision that it believed Mr. Hawkins
was competent at the time of his trial. As addressed above, the United States Supreme
Court has remanded cases to the district court for a new competency hearing because
of the "difficulties of retrospectively determining the petitioner's competency as of more
than a year ago[.]" /d. 362 U.S. at 403. In Blunt v. United States, 389 F.2d 545 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), the Court remanded a case for a new competency hearing because the
hearing was held 32 months ago, which was 10 months before the trial, citing to the
difficulties of retrospective competence determinations. /d. at 549. See also Leonard v.
State, 658 P.2d 785 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (remanding a case for a new competence
evaluation just over two years after the trial, because "We feel that the difficulty of
making a retrospective determination of Leonard's competence to stand trial requires
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that we order a new trial proceeded by a competence determination."); People v.

Cartagena, 92 A.D.2d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (holding that "Given the difficulties of
determining, nunc pro tunc, defendant's fitness to proceed, the post conviction hearing,
held more than one year and four months after the plea ... could not adequately protect
defendant's due process right where defendant was not examined for competency at
the time of the pleas and sentences."). Thus, Mr. Hawkins asserts that 34 months since
the passage of his trial is too long for a retrospective competence evaluation, especially
considering the static nature of mental illness.

Even the district court expressed its

concern that if Mr. Hawkins were retried, it would be required "have a psychiatrist
present during the trial" in case Mr. Hawkins were to act out during the new trial. (R.,
pp.274-275.) Certainly, it would be extremely difficult to determine whether Mr. Hawkins
maintained competency throughout his trial 34 months ago considering the static nature
of mental illness.
Accordingly, Mr. Hawkins asks this Court to remand his case back to the district
court for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Hawkins asks that this Court affirm the district court's order holding that it
was bound by "law of the case" and remand Mr. Hawkins' case for a new trial.
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2012.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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